








of	 interest	 in	the	history	of	 international	 law.2		Whether	or	not	this	may	warrant	




otherwise	 available?	 	 How	 might	 it	 relate	 to	 the	 themes,	 interests,	 or	 pre-
occupations	of	mainstream	international	legal	thought	up	until	that	time?		Whilst	
these	 are	 undoubtedly	 interesting	 and	 important	 questions,	 they	 pose,	 in	 turn,	
two	more	general	questions	as	to	the	relationship	between	theory	and	history	in	
international	 legal	 discourse.	 	One	of	 these,	 of	 course,	 concerns	 the	 theoretical	
and	methodological	conditions	underpinning	the	representation	of	something	as	
the	past	of	 international	 law:	what	 is	 the	 relationship	between	the	text	and	the	
past?	 How	 might	 one	 understand	 the	 act	 of	 ‘representation’?	 	 What	 kind	 of	
international	 law	 is	 being	 represented?	 If	 such	 questions	 are	 concerned	 with	
placing	‘history’	within	the	ambit	of	theory,	it	is	also	clear	that	one	must	attend	to	























historical	 hue,	 requiring	 its	 discourse	 and	 practice	 to	 be	 organized	 in	 temporal	
terms,	and	its	past	‘found’	or	‘uncovered’.	The	significance	of	this,	I	argue,	is	not	
merely	 confined	 to	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 publicists	 and	 jurists	 suddenly	
became	interested	in	the	past	in	a	way	that	wasn’t	apparent	before,	but	that	this	
historical	 consciousness	 fundamentally	 re-shaped	 the	 conceptualization	of	what	
was	 to	 become	 known	 as	 ‘international	 law’,	 and	 placed	 at	 centre-stage	 the	
problem	of	historical	method.		In	the	second	place,	and	following	from	this,	I	want	
to	suggest	that	not	only	did	the	emergence	of	this	historical	consciousness	have	
specifiable	 theoretical	 and	 practical	 dimensions,	 but	 that	 it	 would	 become,	 as	












de	Martens6	and	 Ompteda	 in	 17857	and,	 indeed,	 of	Moser	 in	 1764.8	But	 there	 is	




genre	 in	 the	 19th	 Century	 (from	Wheaton9	through	 to	 Nys10)	 but	 every	 general	
textbook	on	the	subject	of	international	law	would,	almost	by	compulsion,	begin	
with	 an	 historical	 account	 of	 one	 form	 or	 another.	 	 And	 to	 a	 large	 extent,	 this	
remains	the	model	to	this	day.	
	Ward’s	 account	 itself	 is	 revealing	 enough	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	turn	to	history.	 	He	makes	clear	in	the	preface	to	the	book,	that	it	had	not	been	
his	 original	 intention	 to	write	 a	 book	 on	 the	 history	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nations,	 but	
rather	a	treatise	on	diplomatic	law	–	an	account	of	sovereignty	and	of	the	rights	
and	privileges	of	ambassadors.11		Having	collected	the	relevant	materials,	he	tells	
us,	 he	was	 then	prompted	 to	 ask	himself	 as	 to	 the	 conditions	 ‘under	which	we	





















when	 I	 recollected	 the	 great	 difference	 of	 opinion	 there	was	 among	 very	
learned	men,	of	the	same	nations	and	ages,	and	who	had	the	same	sort	of	
education	concerning	the	law	of	Nature	itself;	I	was	still	more	staggered	in	
my	belief	 that	all	 the	world	were	bound	 to	obey	 the	 ramified	and	definite	
scheme	of	duties	called	the	Law	of	nations.’13	
He	continued	by	observing	that:	
‘although	 I	myself	could	make	out	 the	obligation	of	 the	Law	of	Nations	as	




its	 application,	 and	even	 as	 to	 its	 general	 and	 fundamental	 principles.	 The	
history	 of	 mankind	 confirmed	 to	 me	 that	 there	 was	 such	 a	 difference	 in	
almost	 all	 its	 extent;	 that	 men	 had	 the	 most	 opposite	 opinions	 of	 their	
duties	towards	one	another,	if	not	in	the	great	outline	and	first	principles	of	
those	duties,	yet	most	certainly	in	the	application	of	them;	and	that	this	was	
occasioned	 by	 the	 varieties	 of	 religion	 and	 the	 moral	 systems	 which	
governed	them,	operated	upon	also	by	important	local	circumstances	which	
are	often	of	such	consequence	in	their	direction.’14	














natural	 right,	but	 rather	 the	other	way	 round.	 	 It	was,	 in	part	at	 least,	historical	
enquiry	that	had	 led	Ward	to	a	position	of	 incredulity	 in	respect	of	the	universal	
pretensions	of	natural	law	(his	thesis,	as	he	put	it,	was	‘proved	by	history’15).		The	
natural	 law	 he	 encountered	 was	 not	 in	 its	 own	 right	 alien	 to	 him	 (nor	 indeed	
irrelevant),	but	it	was	his	experience	of	his	own	historical	subjectivity	that	led	him	
to	 the	 realisation	 that	 its	 prescriptions	 could	 not	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 ratio	
scripta	of	a	singular	divine	being	or	of	a	universal	rational	consciousness.		Rather	
they	 appeared	 to	 him	 as	 moral	 and	 religious	 injunctions	 specified	 by	 time	 and	
place,	engendered	in	particular	through	education	and	moral	learning.		If	‘being	in	
time’,	however,	was	an	existential	condition	that	gave	expression	to	Ward’s	sense	









In	 the	 second	place,	 and	as	a	 consequence	of	 this,	Ward’s	understanding	of	his	
own	historical	condition	was	one	that	had	not	only	temporal,	but	also	decisively	
spatial,	 connotations.	 	 If	 his	 experience	 of	 history	 was	 one	 that	 placed	 at	 its	
centre	 the	 place	 of	 human	 agency	 in	 the	 propagation	 and	 dissemination	 of	






agency	 to	 be	 the	 active	 product	 of	 that	 process),	 it	 was	 one	 that	 had	 as	 its	
complement	a	spatial	differentiation	between	the	cultural	field	within	which	this	
was	 to	 take	 place	 (Europe),	 and	 that	 which	 demarcated	 the	 space	 in	 which	
















Ward,	 in	 other	 words,	 was	 a	 vast,	 heterogeneous,	 field	 of	 experience	 within	





much	 happened,	 apparently),	 it	 was	 a	 chronology	 conditioned	 by	 an	 ongoing	
process	 of	 disciplinary	 dispersion	 (in	which	 ‘law’	was	 to	 be	 differentiated	 from	






would	 be	 disclosed	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 each	 discipline’s	 own	 peculiar	
moment(s)	of	origin.	
	
The	historical	consciousness	 that	Ward	brought	 to	bear	 in	his	account	may	thus	
be	 thought	 to	 have	 three	 key	 features:	 a	 critique	 of	 universal	 metaphysics	 in	
favour	 of	 an	 emphasis	 upon	 the	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 conditions	 of	 social	 and	
cultural	production	(of	law,	ethics,	faith	etc);	a	belief	that	each	of	these	orders	of	
knowledge	-	the	temporal	and	the	spatial	-	were	of	the	same	analytical	character;	
and	 a	 belief	 in	 the	 specificity	 of	 international	 legal	 history	 as	 a	 disciplinary	 sub-
field.	Yet,	if	these	are	the	main	methodological	assumptions	that	might	be	said	to	
inform	 the	 content	 of	 his	work,	 they	 are	 also	 assumptions	 that	 have	 a	 bearing	
upon	how	that	work	itself	might	be	received	or	understood.		For,	if	the	history	he	
was	to	narrate	was	a	history	of	a	contingent	historical	consciousness,	it	was	one	
that	 necessarily	 posed	 the	 same	 questions	 of	 itself:	 what	 made	 it	 possible	 for	
Ward	to	write	this	history?		What	was	available	to	him,	in	terms	of	received	forms	
of	knowledge	or	understanding,	that	made	the	writing	of	a	history	of	the	law	of	
nations	 both	 plausible	 and	 necessary?	 My	 contention,	 here,	 is	 that	 Ward	 was	
working	 in	 a	 social	 and	 intellectual	 environment	 in	 which	 ‘history’	 as	 a	 field	 of	
knowledge	and	a	form	of	social	and	political	consciousness,	was	not	only	actively	








long-standing	 analytics	 of	 erudition	 (concerned	 with	 examining	 the	 veracity	 of	
sources),	 diplomatics	 (the	 textual	 examination	 of	 documents),	 paleology	 (an	
analysis	 of	 antiquities),	 and	 philology	 (concerned	 with	 placing	 a	 text	 within	 its	
		
historical	and	cultural	 context),	 and	which	was	 to	become	the	hallmark	of	early	
19th	 Century	 ‘professional’	 historiography. 20 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 was	 the	
emergence	of	 linear,	progressive,	histories,	 that	were	 to	mark,	 in	particular,	 the	
stadial	 theories	 of	 the	 Scottish	 enlightenment 21 and	 which	 supplanted	 the	
repetitive,	 cyclical,	 or	 providential	 Biblical	 chronology	 that	 characterized	
historiography	until	that	time.22	
	
In	 Koselleck’s	 terms,	 these	 historiographical	 developments	 were	 key	
characteristics	of	what	he	called	the	‘new	time’	(Neuzeit)	of	modernity	that	was	to	










more.	 	 In	 its	 first	and	most	 immediate	sense,	a	consciousness	of	history	moving	
through	 time	was	 a	development	 that	had	obvious	 significance	 for	purposes	of	
















natural	 lawyers	 who	 came	 to	 be	 represented,	 by	 Ward	 and	 his	 successors,	 as	
representatives	of	the	discursive	‘tradition’	of	international	law,	had	worked	with	
a	 remarkably	 limited	 sense	 of	 temporal	 specificity.	 	 Grotius,	 for	 example,	 had	
argued	that:	
‘History	 in	 relation	 to	 our	 subject	 is	 useful	 in	 two	 ways:	 it	 supplies	 both	
illustrations	 and	 judgements.	 The	 illustrations	 have	 greater	 weight	 in	
proportion	as	they	are	taken	from	better	times	and	better	peoples;	thus	we	
have	 preferred	 ancient	 examples,	 Greek	 and	 Roman,	 to	 the	 rest.	 And	




For	 Grotius,	 in	 other	 words,	 history	 was	 a	 flat,	 limitless,	 field	 of	 insight	 that	
imposed	 no	 order,	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 over	 the	marshaling	 of	 relevant	 sources	 of	
authority.		No	sense	of	temporal	proximity	operated	here	as	a	way	of	estimating	
the	 value	 of	 judgment	 and/or	 illustration	 –	 if	 anything,	 authority	 seemed	 to	 be	
associated	with	temporal	distance	(towards	the	 ‘better’	 times	of	Rome)	or	with	
the	 repetitive	 reoccurrence	 of	 the	 same	 (as	 a	 means	 by	 which	 ‘common	
agreement’	might	 be	discerned25).	 If,	 in	 the	 ensuing	 century,	 one	may	note	 the	
subtle	appearance	of	various	historical	and	temporal	themes	(e.g.	 in	Pufendorf’s	
account	of	 the	development	of	natural	 sociability26)	 even	as	 late	as	Vattel,	who	
wrote	 very	 self-consciously	 about	 his	 own	 ‘modern’	 times,	 there	 is	 no	 meter,	














put	 it	 in	 1795,	whereas	Grotius	 had	 formerly	 relied	much	 on	 the	 insights	 of	 the	
poets	and	orators	of	Rome,	
‘[the]	 political	 situation	 of	 Europe	 is	 so	much	 changed,	 since	 the	 fifth	
century	 in	 particular,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Christian	 Religion,	 and	 of	
the	hierarchical	system	and	all	its	important	consequences,	the	invention	
of	 gunpowder,	 the	 discovery	 of	 America	 and	 the	 passage	 to	 the	 East	
Indies,	 the	 ever-increasing	 taste	 for	 pomp	 and	 luxury,	 the	 jealous	




of	the	Christian	Era.	 .	 .	 .	 It	 is,	 then,	 in	the	history	of	Europe	(and	of	the	
states	of	which	 it	 is	composed)	during	the	 last	centuries,	 that	we	must	
look	for	the	existing	law	of	nations.’28	
Immediately,	 this	 was	 to	 focus	 attention	 on	 the	 customs	 and	 practices	 of	
European	states,	upon	the	‘positive’	or	‘voluntary’	law	of	nations	as	exemplified	in	
treaties	and	diplomatic	exchanges,	 rather	 than	upon	the	 rationalist	discourse	of	
the	natural	law.		But	it	was	also	to	re-shape	the	way	in	which	the	literary	tradition	
of	natural	law	itself	was	to	be	received.		The	figures	of	Grotius,	Pufendorf,	Vattel	
etc.	 would	 acquire	 a	 new	 vital	 resonance:	 no	 longer	 would	 they	 simply	 be	 the	
most	prominent,	or	wise,	advocates	of	a	universal	metaphysics	(and	represent,	in	
that	 sense,	 a	 textual,	 literary	 tradition	 of	 judgment	 and	 opinion),	 but	 would	
become	 representatives	 of	 a	 definitively	 historical	 tradition	 of	 thought	 and	






or	 lesser	 distinction	 as	 to	 the	 nature	 or	 content	 of	 the	 law	 of	 nations.29	Their	
work,	 furthermore,	would	 no	 longer	 be	 valued	merely	 in	 terms	of	 its	 precision,	
rigour,	 or	 exhaustive	 character,	 but	 by	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 it	 spoke	 to	 a	
contemporary	 moral	 or	 political	 consciousness	 that	 was	 aware	 of	 its	 own	
historical	 place.	 	 The	 historicist	 alignment	 of	 judgment	 and	 social	 context	 that	
informed	this,	was	to	add	a	new	evaluative	element	to	all	 the	standard	themes:	







was	 it	 to	 discover	 new	 temporal	 categories.	 	 The	 ‘present’	 would	 emerge,	 no	
longer	 being	 a	 ‘moment	 of	 profound	 forgetfulness’,30	but	 as	 the	 measure	 by	
which	 the	past	was	 to	be	 revealed	and	analysed.	Categories	of	 legal	knowledge	
would	gain	or	lose	significance	for	the	commentator	now	critically	aware	of	their	
own	 surroundings.	 	 New	 questions	 would	 appear	 (‘recognition’,	 ‘intervention’,	
control	 over	 the	 use	 of	 weaponry)	 and	 old	 ones	 be	 displaced	 (e.g.:	 marriage,	
procreation,	 education,	 or	 filial	 duty).	 	 New	 distinctions	 would	 also	 emerge	 –	
between	‘international’	and	‘national’,31	between	public	and	private,	between	law	
















change,	 or	 evaluate	 arguments	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 contemporary	 needs	 or	
interests	of	states	or	societies.		The	future,	furthermore,	would	also	appear	to	be	
radically	 open:	 a	 temporal	 category	 towards	which	 energies	might	 be	 invested	
(towards	 liberty,	 justice,	 and	 perpetual	 peace	 and	 away	 from	 despotism,	
absolutism,	 and	 war)	 and	 around	 which	 intellectual	 and	 practical	 projects,	
programmes	and	policies	might	gain	their	measure	and	purpose.32	If	the	theme	of	
‘self-perfection’	 that	 had	 run	 through	 the	 work	 of	 both	 Wolff	 and	 Vattel,	 had	
already	 opened	 out	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 Telos	 of	 social	 and	 political	 organization	 (the	
procuring	of	the	necessities	of	life,	of	peace,	security	and	well-being),	it	was	in	the	
19th	 Century	 that	 identifiable	 nascent	 ‘futures’—civilization,	 secularism,	














extent	 that	 the	most	differentiated	 levels	of	development,	 decelerations	















as	 Locke	 had	 already	 intimated,	 provided	 immediate	 access	 to	 the	 historic	
underpinnings	 of	 civilised	 European	 society,	 so	 also	were	 19th	 Century	 jurists	 to	
recognize	the	conditions	of	savage	or	barbaric	existence	elsewhere	as	being	open	
to	 the	 possibility	 of	 maturation	 and	 change,	 and	 to	 the	 acquisition	 of	 legal	
subjectivity	(of	their	 ‘entry	 into	history’	as	Hegel	was	to	put	 it).	 	This,	of	course,	
was	 to	 lend	 itself	 to	 a	 new	 rationality	 of	 imperial	 rule	 -	 the	 production	 of	
civilization	 through	 beneficent	 colonization,	 and	 to	 the	 organization	 of	 legal	
knowledge	 around	 those	 categories	 (from	 the	 conduct	 of	 warfare	 through	 to	
territorial	 title	 and	 statehood). 35 	It	 was	 also	 to	 survive	 in	 the	 diachronic	




and	 standpoint–upon,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 the	 social	 and	 intellectual	
framework	that	undergirded	the	production	of	the	literature	of	history	itself–not	












have	 its	 own	 history,	 and	 one	 that	 would	 be	 distinct,	 as	 Ward	 noted,	 from	
political,	economic,	social	or	cultural	history.		International	legal	history,	thus,	was	
always	to	be	understood	 in	terms	of	 its	own	generative	specificity,	with	 its	own	
moments	of	 inauguration	and	change,	departures	and	dispersals.	 	The	pursuit	of	
its	‘origin’	would	become	an	important	pre-requisite:	as	being	that	which	enabled	
its	 capture	 as	 a	 unified	 and	 continuous	 historical	 phenomenon,	 and	 which	
disclosed,	at	the	same	moment,	its	fundamental	essence.		
	
This	was,	by	no	means,	 to	 resolve	 itself	 in	a	uniform	historiography,	but	was	 to	
bring	to	the	forefront	two	dynamics.		In	the	first	place,	it	would	be	conditioned	by	
the	 simultaneous	 excision	 of	 things	 impure	 (politics,	 ethics,	 sociology,	
anthropology,	 economics	 etc),	 and	 their	 reintroduction	 in	 the	 field	 of	 legal	
knowledge	as	background	conditions.	 	History,	 in	other	words,	would	always	be	
written	by	reference	to	a	sense	of	law’s	boundaries,	or	of	its	specificity	in	relation	





between	 the	 voluntary	 and	 natural	 law	 of	 nations	 was	 broken	 apart,	 and	 a	
situated	ethics	of	international	law	was	to	be	placed	in	a	condition	of	permanent	
struggle	against	the	‘realism’	of	historical	knowledge.		As	Hayden	White	explains,	
historiography	 was	 to	 function	 at	 this	 time	 as	 the	 very	 paradigm	 of	 realistic	
discourse,	 ‘constituting	 an	 image	 of	 a	 current	 social	 praxis	 as	 the	 criterion	 of	
plausibility	by	reference	to	which	any	given	institution,	activity,	thought,	or	even	a	
















the	 ground	 for	 the	 articulation	 of	 a	 European	 international	 law,	 built	 upon	 the	
(historically	conditioned)	customs	and	practices	of	European	nation	states,40	and	
invested	with	 a	 teleology	 that	 took	 as	 its	 object	 the	 advancement	 of	 freedom,	
humanity,	peace,	and	prosperity,	 it	was	a	consciousness	containing	within	 itself,	
the	conditions	of	 its	own	critique.	 	For	the	very	object	that	international	 lawyers	
took	as	their	task	–	the	creation	of	a	system	of	rules	and	institutions	of	universal	
character	–	was	confronted,	at	every	moment,	by	the	apparent	particularity	of	its	
own	 historical	 emergence.	 If	 this	 was	 not	 immediately	 apparent	 for	 those	
engaged	in	writing	the	histories	of	the	seamless	 ‘expansion’	of	 international	 law	
in	the	19th	and	20th	Centuries,	or	indeed	for	those	concerned	with	the	elaboration	
of	 analytical	 or	 policy-oriented	 discourses	 that	 operated	 within	 historically	
disinterested	 fields	 of	 enquiry,	 it	was	 to	 become	 very	much	more	 so	 for	 those,	






















apparently	 ‘shrunk’	 the	world	 of	 international	 law,	 ignoring	 in	 the	 process,	 the	
empirical	practices	(treaties,	agreements,	diplomatic	exchanges)	that	had	marked	
the	 relationship	between	 the	European	and	non-European	worlds.44		Others	 still	
embraced	 the	 European	 narrative,	 confident	 in	 the	 promise	 of	 a	 functionalist	
analytics	that	envisaged	that	changes	in	the	structure	of	international	law	would	
simply	 ensue	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 changing	 shape	 and	 character	 of	
international	society.45		All	embraced	in	one	form	or	another,	however,	a	belief	in	
the	possibility	of	the	articulation	of	a	universal	history	of	international	law	‘in	the	




to	 the	 history	 of	 international	 law,	 they	 did	 so	 largely	 by	 leaving	 intact	 the	
















in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	 simply	 subsume	 the	 non-European	 periphery	 into	 an	
essentially	European	narrative	of	progress	has	been	a	point	of	constant	attention.		
And	 in	 the	 process,	 such	 histories	 have	 gained	 new	 inflections.	 Some,	 such	 as	
Anghie	and	Becker	have	sought	to	re-inscribe	the	periphery	within	an	account	of	
mainstream	 legal	 thought	 and	practice,	 either	by	 identifying	 it	 as	 the	unspoken	
‘referent’	of	doctrinal	argument	(in	which	the	‘standard	of	civilisation’	 is	seen	to	
invest	 itself	 as	 a	 trope	 within	 the	 deep	 structure	 of	 legal	 doctrine48),	 or	 by	
bringing	 to	 light	 the	 critical	 contribution	 of	 scholars	 from	 the	 periphery	 in	







If	 the	main	 target	of	 such	accounts	has	been	 the	displacement	or	 avoidance	of	
certain	 facets	 of	 the	 received	 historical	 method	 –	 denying,	 for	 example,	 the	
possibility	of	describing	the	history	of	international	law	in	terms	of	its	triumphal,	
‘progressive’,	 expansion	 from	 core	 to	 periphery	 –	 they	 have,	 at	 the	 same	
moment,	 maintained	 fealty	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 there	 is	 a	 specifiable	 history	 of	
international	 law	 whose	 ‘origins’	 may	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 the	 19th	 Century	 and	
beyond,	and	that	the	central	task	is	one	of	re-describing	that	history	in	a	way	that	
inserts	 the	 excluded	 ‘other’	 back	 into	 that	 story.	 	Whilst,	 in	 other	 words,	 such	











of	 international	 legal	history	might	be52	-	whether,	 for	example,	 it	 is	a	history	of	
doctrine	or	practice,	a	history	of	structures	or	processes,	a	history	attentive	to	the	
non-European	 as	 well	 as	 the	 European	 experience53	–	 but	 that	 the	 question	 of	






means	 chosen	 by	 which	 it	 is	 to	 be	 represented,	 but	 a	 field	 of	 practice	 whose	
meaning	 and	 significance	 is	 constantly	 organised	 around,	 and	 through	 the	
medium	of,	a	discourse	that	links	present	to	past.	As	such,	the	specification	of	its	




accounts	 (specifically,	 those	 written	 in	 progressive,	 objective	 or	 functionalist	
terms),	 Skouteris	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	 essentially	 discursive	 character	 of	
international	 legal	history	and	to	 its	 reducible	priority	of	authorial	agency	 in	 the	
‘production’	of	the	past.		He	forefronts,	in	the	process,	two	ideas.	The	first	is	that	
the	past	itself	is	never	available	to	the	legal	historian	‘as	actual	events’,	but	only	in	















involve	 acts	 of	 selection	 and	 arrangement	 –	 decisions	 both	 as	 to	what	 is	 to	 be	
represented	 (state	 practice,	 judicial	 decisions	 etc),	 and	 as	 to	 how	 those	 past	
events,	once	 reconstructed,	will	be	organised	and	 related	 to	one	another.55	In	a	
positive	 sense,	 this	draws	attention	 to	what	Hayden	White	 calls	 the	 ‘content	of	
the	 form’,	 bringing	 into	 view	 the	 (ideological)	 role	 of	 aesthetic	 structure	 or	
narrative	organisation	in	the	generation	of	historical	meaning.	At	the	same	time,	
however,	 Skouteris	 notes	 that	 the	 further	 one	 emphasises	 the	 constructed	
character	of	history,	and	the	centrality	of	the	historian	in	its	production,	the	more	
it	 ‘seems	 to	 dissolve	 any	 possible	 ground	 for	 assessing	 the	 historical	 past’	 and	
undermines	 ‘the	 possibility	 of	 performing	 much	 for	 the	 work	 that	 any	 jurist	 is	









new	purpose	 in	 the	present,57	then	 the	problem	may	not	be	 that	of	getting	 the	













kinds	of	 history	 appear	 to	make	 themselves	 available	 in	 contemporary	 settings.		
The	past,	it	might	be	said,	only	answers	the	questions	we	pose	of	it,	but	the	kinds	




the	 ‘contemporary	 limits	of	the	necessary’.	What	 is	needed	for	that	purpose,	he	
suggests,	 is	 an	 ‘historical	 investigation	 into	 the	 events	 that	 have	 led	 us	 to	
constitute	ourselves	and	to	recognise	ourselves	as	subjects	of	what	we	are	doing,	
thinking,	saying’.58	This	may	be	seen	to	open	out	two	new	avenues	of	thought.		In	
the	 first	 place,	 it	 is	 to	 give	 recognition	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 authorial	 jurist	who	
claims	 to	 exercise	 sovereignty	 over	 the	 literary	 patterning	 of	 the	 past	 of	
international	law,	is	 itself	a	subject	inserted	within	an	(historical)	and	intellectual	
context.	 If	 this	works	upon	Marx’s	 intuition	 that	we	make	our	own	history,	but	
not	in	conditions	of	our	own	choosing,	the	answer	is	not	merely	to	strip	away	all	
superstition	about	 the	past	 (i.e.	 subject	 it	 to	a	critique	of	 ideology),	but	seek	 to	
identify	 and	 specify	 the	 historic	 conditions	 that	 both	 ‘produce’	 the	 field	 of	
professional	 expertise	 that	enables	 international	 lawyers	 to	 imagine	 themselves	
as	interlocutors	within	a	specifiable	discourse	and	practice,	and	which	also	serve	
to	delimit	the	boundaries	of	what	it	is	possible	to	say	or	think	in	that	context.	This	
may	 be	 such	 as	 to	 push	 historiography	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 accounts	 that	 both	
situate	 the	emergence	of	disciplinary	expertise	within	broader	social,	economic,	
cultural	 and	 political	 fields	 at	 the	 same	 time	 as	 orienting	 it	 towards	 broader	
questions	of	structure	(the	conditioning	place,	for	example,	of	class	and	capital).			
	
In	 the	second	place,	and	 in	a	similar	sense,	 it	pushes	attention	towards	thinking	
about	the	contemporary	world	of	international	law,	not	in	terms	of	a	specified	set	
of	actors	and	agencies,	powers	and	competences,	that	are	already	firmly	grasped	




understand	 the	 regulatory	 activities	 of	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 WTO	 as	
contributing	to,	and	shaping,	our	social,	political	and	economic	knowledge	of	the	
world	 (within	which	 it	 then	seeks	 to	 insert	 itself),59	so	also	may	one	understand	
the	 regimes	 of	 authority	 that	 structure	 international	 legal	 doctrine	 (states,	
governments,	institutions	etc)	as	simply	that	–	claims	to	authority,	knowledge	and	






one	that	 folds	back	upon	 itself:	how	 is	one	to	provide	an	(historical)	account	of	
the	emergence	of	the	category	of	the	historical	within	 international	 law	without	
already	presuming	its	existence?		The	result,	in	a	sense,	is	a	partial,	and	imperfect,	




phases.	 	 In	 the	 first	 of	 these	 the	 agenda	 was	 to	 place	 international	 law	 itself	
within	the	frame	of	history	–	to	historicise	its	normative	conditions,	to	identify	its	
origins,	and	 to	map	out	 its	emergence	and	evolution	over	 time.	 	 If,	 initially,	 this	
was	 to	 gesture	 towards	 the	 dispersion	 of	 things	 in	 space	 (to	 a	 differentiated	
geographical	 legal	 knowledge)	 it	was	nevertheless	 reintegrated	by	means	of	 its	
incorporation	 within	 a	 singular	 chronology.	 	 Development,	 progress,	 evolution	








how	to	grasp	 itself	 in	 its	own	historical	conditions.	 If	the	history	of	 international	
law	today	is	unavoidably	a	history	of	the	present,	one	task	may	be	to	understand	
the	patterns	of	 deployment	 and	 consumption,	 attending	 to	 the	blind-spots	 and	
biases	 in	 contemporary	 accounts,	 yet	 another	 and	 perhaps	 more	 arduous	 task	
may	 be	 to	 understand	 the	 (historic)	 conditions	 that	 delimit	 the	 parameters	 of	
what	may	or	may	not	be	rendered	as	the	past	of	international	law	today.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
